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A Force of Reason

Canada, Central America, and
the Grupo de Observadores de
la Naciones Unidas para Centro
America (ONUCA), 1983-1992
Andrew B. Godefroy

T

hough the Cold War never led to open hostilities
between the United States of America and the
Soviet Union, the two superpowers did engage in
a seemingly endless series of wars by proxy in
their struggle for dominance over international
affairs. One of the major arenas was Central
America, where regional politics influenced by
ideologies led to decades of internal and external
strife. Yet a glimmer of hope for peace emerged
in the early 1980s even though acrimonious
relations persisted between the US and USSR.
Central and South American governments, with
the encouragement of more distant nations,
began a process of negotiation that eventually
led to a reversal of the cycle violence.1 Canada
played a leading role in providing substantial
diplomatic and military assistance.2 It was not the
first time that the country had assumed the role of
impartial arbiter in international affairs. However,
Canada’s political involvement and its subsequent
participation in the Grupo de Observadores
de la Naciones Unidas para Centro America
(ONUCA) presented unique political and military
challenges that foreshadowed the tremendous
difficulties Canadian peacekeepers would face
just a few years later in the Balkans.

and territorial control. Ongoing disputes between
military juntas and leftist guerrillas destabilized
the region, with ongoing wars in El Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Guatemala being particularly
violent. The growing crisis prompted several
international leaders and activists to push for a
resolution of the conflicts at the beginning of the
1980s, expressing the fear that if the situation
was allowed to deteriorate any further the Central
American wars might seriously disrupt the
western alliance.3

Setting the Stage for Peace

In 1984 the Contadora Group presented
a second initiative named the Contadora Act
on Peace and Cooperation in Central America.
Though often considered a failure in Latin
American political history, the act was an

C

entral America suffered from conflict
throughout most of the Cold War as numerous
militant factions wrestled for political, economic,

In early 1983 the governments of Colombia,
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela met at Isla
Contadora just off the Panamanian coast
to discuss options for an all-encompassing
regional peace accord. It was a remote, but
not inappropriate, location having previously
come to international notice in 1979 as the
temporary place of exile for the Shah of Iran. The
participants produced a document of objectives,
which included the promotion of democracy,
the ending of armed conflict, improvements
in compliance with international laws, and
economic revitalization. In September 1983 the
“Contadora Group” ratified the list at a signing
ceremony in Panama City.
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ambitious initiative aimed at the whole Central
American region, and a watershed for the InterAmerican system and the United States-Latin
American relationship. More important, it led to
significant changes in the roles of both the United
Nations and the Organization of American States
(OAS) in Latin America, and planted the seeds for
the notion of “zones of peace” across the western
hemisphere and in particular, in areas of conflict
in the Central American region.4
The demise of the Contadora Act in late 1986
resulted in a new initiative put forward by Costa
Rican President Oscar Arias at a summit in
February 1987 – “Una hora para la paz” [“A Time
For Peace”]. The Arias peace proposal differed
greatly from the Contadora Act in that there was
a greater emphasis on internal democratisation
and a reduced role for external actors. The plan
retained the Contadora principle of disarmament
and verification by a third party however, and
requested that the secretary-general of the United
Nations, the OAS, and the foreign ministers of
the Contadora plan nations and support group
countries form this oversight committee. It went
against American policy towards Nicaragua by
encouraging the disarmament of the Contras
while simultaneously encouraging the Sandinista
government to move towards a more democratic
state. The White House would have preferred
the Sandinistas make the first move, but, Arias
correctly argued that a move towards peace
required concurrent enforcement by all parties.
Two attempts were made by the US in the
summer of 1987 to sink the Arias proposal.
The first, in July at Tegucigalpa, failed when
Mexico prevented Honduras from replacing the
Arias draft.5 The occasion of the second attempt
to supersede Arias’ document, known as the
“Reagan-Wright Plan,” was the Esquipulas meeting
where the five Central American presidents
planned to endorse Arias’ proposal. Arias had
been forewarned of the American manoeuvre and
was able to persuade his four colleagues to ratify
his peace proposal on 7 August 1987.6
With a formal agreement reached, the
“Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm
and Lasting Peace in Central America,” known
both as the Esquipulas II Agreement and the
Guatemala Procedure, came into effect. Designed
initially to end hostilities between government

forces and insurrectionist movements in the five
Central American countries, the process grew
to include several aspects of democratisation.7
The Esquipulas II Agreement called for an
immediate cease-fire, national reconciliation,
amnesty, democratisation, an end to aiding
insurgent movements, and free elections. While
not fundamentally altering the structure of the
Central American region it created a mutual
confidence that ultimately allowed several peace
building measures to move ahead. The key to
ensuring the longevity of the peace agreement was
the provision of an unbiased means of security
and verification.
Efforts to enforce Esquipulas II quickly
stagnated. The International Commission for
Verification and Follow-up (CIVS - Comisión
Internacional de Verificación y Seguimiento)
formed to enforce the agreement, met with
considerable difficulties in the field. Both its
mandate and authority were never fully clarified,
a basic error considering that the CIVS was
expected to determine the most appropriate
verification organization and operations.8 The
CIVS membership of South American and other
neutral parties to counter US challenges to its
legitimacy, moreover, suggested to the Central
American states that outsiders were dictating
their future. Worse still, the activities of the
CIVS appeared to be partial towards groups
opposing the Central American governments,
and this perceived favouritism quickly led to
the commission’s demise. The report filed by
the CIVS in January 1988 heavily criticised the
governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras. Unsurprisingly, the Central American
governments (with the exception of Nicaragua
which had received relatively little criticism)
dismissed the report outright and politely but
swiftly shut down the CIVS.9
It was well over a year before another
attempt at verification of Esquipulas II was
made. In the meantime, fighting broke out once
more along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border
between Sandinista forces and Contras, further
jeopardizing the conditions for peace. In April
1988 a meeting of the Esquipulas Executive
Commission (consisting of the Central American
foreign ministers) resulted in the creation of a
Technical Advisory Group (TAG), made up of
Canada, Spain, the Federal Republic of Germany,
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and Venezuela. The TAG set the parameters for
the verification of the peace process and was in
essence the predecessor and catalyst of ONUCA,
and those involved in the former eventually
became the core of the latter.10
With the conditions for peace in place, the OAS
and the UN were requested to provide both civilian
and military elements to monitor and verify the
fulfilment of the commitments contained in the

Equipment arrives in-country to support
Canada’s contribution to ONUCA:
Left: A Canadian Forces truck, pre-painted
in UN white, rolls off a ship after the voyage
from Canada.
Below: CF ground crew unpacking a newlyarrived Canadian Jet Ranger helicopter at
Tegucigalpa Airport, Honduras.

Esquipulas II agreement.11 ONUCA,
the first UN military mission to the
region, was established by the UN
Security Council in November 1989.
Though the conditions for peace in
Central America were favourable,
Canadian presence and leadership
in ONUCA at both the political and
military level became instrumental
in ensuring the success of the entire
process.

Implementation of the
Peace Plan

T

he Contadora Act negotiations
of the early 1980s coincided
with a renewed interest in the
region by Canada. Influenced by
a variety of Canadian public and
private interest groups, the House
of Commons Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National
Defence (SCEAND) published
a major report in 1982 entitled
Canada’s Relations With Latin
America and the Caribbean. 12
The document recommended a
higher priority for the whole region
in Canadian foreign policy and a
conference of representatives of all
the states in the Americas to discuss
security issues in the Caribbean and
Central America. It was the first step
in an increased Canadian political interest in the
region, after decades of aloofness.13
Despite a desire to increase Canadian
influence, Ottawa had to be mindful of potential
confrontations with the United States. While
Washington argued that the Central American
conflict was the result of an export of revolution
by a Moscow-Havana axis, Canada generally
believed that the root cause lay in historical

8
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At the UN General Assembly
in September 1983, Canadian
Secretary for External Affairs Allan
MacEachen supported Contadora
and offered Canadian political
support to any successful peace
agreement. From October 1983
Canada became directly involved in
advising all parties in the Central
American peace negotiations, and
made a particular contribution
towards the design of the Control
and Verification Commission in
the various Contadora Act drafts.16
In mid-1984 Mexico, which was
traditionally suspicious of large
peacekeeping forces, rejected the
idea of a Canadian peacekeeping
deployment, but Ottawa continued
to examine how it might bring its
extensive peacekeeping experience
to bear on the region.17

CFJIC IXC90-73

socio-economic problems. 14 The
1982 SCEAND report had neither
recommended that Canada consider
membership in the Organization of
American States (OAS) nor add its
signature to the Rio Pact. However,
the report clearly indicated that
Canadian presence in Latin American
affairs should be increased in the
interests of a multi-lateral resolution
of the conflicts.15

CFJIC IXC90-56

Right: CF personnel unload a Hercules
transport aircraft.
Below: A UN observer group patrols their
assigned area.

Ironically, Canada’s political
absence from the region since the end of the
Second World War allowed Ottawa to appear as a
neutral actor, thus adding a degree of legitimacy
to the peace negotiations. Canada reinforced
its position by rejecting American pressure to
favour El Salvador over Nicaragua in diplomatic
communications. Canada had no desire to
support the US vision of Central America as an
East-West crisis.18 Equally important, Canada
was perhaps the best choice for mediation and
assistance because of the country’s experience
in UN-mandated operations in Asia, Africa, and
the Middle East. Overall, Canada was not only

a favourable candidate but also perhaps the
only legitimate option available for successfully
advancing the peacekeeping process in Central
America.19
Canadian military involvement in the Central
American peace process increased considerably
as the United Nations became more involved in
the Esquipulas II mandate. On 7 October 1987,
the UN General Assembly published a resolution
expressing complete support for the Esquipulas
II agreement and requested the Secretary General
to afford the fullest assistance of the UN towards
9

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2008

Godefroy - ONUCA.indd 9

5

27/05/2008 3:11:10 PM

Canadian Military History, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 2

ONUCA was designed to concentrate in those
areas where activities contrary to the security
undertakings in the Esquipulas II Agreement
were alleged to occur. Of particular concern
were the borders between Costa Rica and
Nicaragua, between Honduras and Nicaragua,
between Honduras and El Salvador, and between
Guatemala and El Salvador. Also the regions
of northeastern Nicaragua and southwestern
Honduras required close attention. When a
complaint was registered with ONUCA, the
mission would contact the government that
was the subject of the complaint and ask for
full cooperation in investigating the matter.
The results of the investigation would then be
transmitted to both governments concerned.21
Planning envisaged four phases for the
ONUCA mission. In the first phase, following
the approval by the UN Security Council to
deploy ONUCA, an advance party of 30 military
officers and civilian support staff led by the Chief
Military Observer (CMO) would establish an
operational headquarters (HQ) at Tegucigalpa,
Honduras. In the second phase an additional
70 observers, five helicopters, and naval vessels
would be deployed to ONUCA HQ, the liaison
offices, and the verification centres. During this
phase of the mission ONUCA would establish the
ability to investigate complaints submitted by any
government, and to conduct limited patrolling
of the conflict areas. During the third phase of
the mission, to be completed no later than three
months after the arrival of the advance party,
a further 63 observers would be deployed in
nine more verification centres supported by an
additional four helicopters. The new verification
centres were to be deployed in strategic areas along
the border where patrolling could be undertaken
without major logistical requirements. The timing
of the last phase of the mission would depend
on the progress and results achieved in the
previous phases and would see the deployment
of another 98 observers and three helicopters

at 14 new verification centres. This last phase
would bring the total to 33 verification centres
and 260 military observers,22 enough, it was
expected, to undertake patrolling of the entire
Central American region.23

CFJIC IXC90-10

the Central American peace effort.20 The following
month the Canadian minister of External Affairs,
Joe Clark, visited Central America, after which
he stated that Canada was prepared to commit
resources for part of or all the work required to
bring the Esquipulas II agreement to fruition.
There was then little doubt that Canada would
be involved with any peacekeeping deployment
to the region.

In November 1987, the Department of
National Defence (DND) dispatched two senior
officers with the minister of External Affairs
on his visit to Central America to conduct
a detailed mission analysis to assess the
proposed concept of operations. One of the two
officers was Lieutenant-Colonel Don Ethell, a
Canadian soldier with considerable peacekeeping
experience. Lieutenant-Colonel Ethell produced a
comprehensive report highlighting the difficulties
of terrain, financial and logistical challenges, and,
most important, the requirement for a clearly
defined mandate and terms of reference prior
to the deployment of any military personnel.24
Both DND and the Department of External
Affairs (DEA) felt that while there was a general
consensus amongst the Central American leaders
on the idea of peace, there was a reluctance to
define clearly the details of that peace. Yet the
devil of complex peacekeeping was in the details,
and Canadian soldiers, unarmed and acting only
as observers, had no desire to find themselves
ill-equipped to face disputes that were sure to
arise. DEA concurred and demanded clarity
from the regional actors. Joe Clark argued in
the House of Commons, “That kind of vagueness
was useful in getting agreement on the peace plan
in the first place, but it is not good enough now.
The regional presidents should be encouraged
as loudly as possible to decide what they mean
by peace, and just exactly how they propose to
go about maintaining it.”25
A number of technical considerations about
the proposed military mission also had to be
considered. The nature of the terrain presented
numerous challenges. Complex hills, peaks, and
valleys hidden under layers of jungle canopy
meant that area coverage would be difficult at
best, as would the detection and discrimination
of various groups moving throughout the region.
DND concluded that any UN mission would
require either large-scale forces stationed all
across the region at key points, or a smaller,
highly mobile force that could readily move
between key points. As well, the success of the
mission depended upon accurate and timely
reporting, but again the terrain of some of the
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A CF Hercules on ﬁnal approach to a Central American airﬁeld.

states made some communications very difficult
and others impossible. DND concluded that a
peacekeeping mission in Central America would
be impossible without considerable political and
technical support for the deployments.26 Given
the state of the Canadian Forces (CF) in 1989,
any involvement of its troops in theatre would be
dependent on additional assets or support to be
successful.
Both the political and the military assessments
of ONUCA’s mandate were indicative of the change
then underway in UN missions in general.
Traditionally, UN missions were based upon the
principles set down in 1958, where forces were
deployed with the consent of all parties and
remained strictly impartial. The primary roles
of soldiers on the ground were to defuse tension,
stabilize situations, and arbitrate disputes. Such
missions were generally achievable despite the
division of the Security Council during the Cold

War. With a foreseeable end to the East-West
struggle, however, the UN felt the chains of
inertia were removed from the Security Council
as it made the transition from competition to
cooperation. A renewed sense of internationalism
was also giving the UN a moral imperative to
intervene where intra-state disorder and massive
human rights abuses and suffering were taking
place. UN missions at the end of the 1980s
therefore contained elements not previously
encountered, such as ONUCA’s mandate to
demobilize and disarm guerrilla armies as well
as stabilize internal groupings and contribute to
humanitarian aid and security.

The Canadian Deployment

L

ittle effort was made in the Canadian Forces
to prepare specifically for the ONUCA mission
following the strategic reconnaissance conducted
11
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in November 1987, and any number of factors
may have contributed to this inactivity. While at
the political level Canada was becoming deeply
involved in Central America, the government was
launching a revised defence policy that refocused
attention on West European collective security. In
June 1987, only two months before Esquipulas
II was signed, the Canadian government tabled
Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy
for Canada, replacing the 1971 White Paper
on defence. Challenge and Commitment
considerably altered the previous Canadian
defence policy, which had been described as
overly optimistic in its assessment of future
international relations, and detrimental to
conventional force development as a deterrent
to Soviet aggression.27 Since 1971 the Canadian
Forces had evolved, but not as the integrated
force under centralized operational command
that Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer
had envisioned when he led the restructuring
of the armed forces in the 1960s. The land, sea
and air elements of the unified forces continued
to operate as distinct services in important yet
largely separate activities in support of national
defence, and the 1987 White Paper reinforced
those separate, loosely linked roles.

Contingency planning for missions at National
Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) was usually
staffed in an ad hoc manner. Although studies
were underway to improve joint operational
staffing and planning, an organization specifically
responsible for such activities in Ottawa did not
appear until July 1990.28 Therefore missions
like ONUCA did not receive the direct attention
of any particular military staff unless they were
specifically ordered to do so. DND and the
CF were later criticized for being ill prepared
for ONUCA when an official announcement of
Canadian participation arrived at NDHQ in
December 1989, but such complaints were
misguided.29 The 1987 White Paper directed that
Canada would not undertake any peacekeeping
mission if “participation will jeopardise other
commitments…and whether participation is
adequately and equitably funded and logistically
supported.”30 Helicopters were to be a main
component of the Central American operation,
yet Canada had just committed a significant
portion of its operational fleet. In 1986 Canada
began participating in the Multinational Force and
Observers (MFO) in the Middle East, replacing
the Australian-New Zealand helicopter unit
with assets from the Canadian Forces’ No.408

CFJIC IXC90-16

Captain Steve France, Royal Canadian Regiment (right), discusses the situation at the Honduran/Nicaraguan
border with Second Lieutenant Jose Martinez (left) of the Honduran Army and another unidentiﬁed UN ofﬁcer.
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Major Rene Gervais (centre) of Canada and Captain Ricardo Illan (right) of Spain, tour the Honduran/Nicaraguan
border crossing point at El Guasaule, accompanied by Lieutenant Ramirez of the Honduran Army.

Squadron.31 As well, the established policy for
Canada was to have two thousand CF members
available for peacekeeping at any one time.
In 1989-90 Canada had approximately 1,100
members already deployed.32
The ONUCA mission, moreover, still waited
on the unanimous consent of five states that
traditionally mistrusted one another, and then
confirmation by Ottawa. Extensive pre-planning
by DND seemed unrealistic given its other
numerous tasks. 33 Previous experience had
demonstrated that the government was quick to
change decisions with respect to UN missions,
and in other cases Canadian intentions were
simply superseded by events. NDHQ staffs
were already stretched and widely committed,
and there is nothing to suggest that the ONUCA
mission received any less attention than other
contingency operations under consideration at
that time.
Even though the final decision to commit
Canadian military resources to ONUCA had yet
to be made, DND was directed by the government
to attach three officers to a reconnaissance team
to the region led by Brigadier-General Péricles
Ferreira Gomes of Brazil in September 1989.34
Brigadier-General Gomes had previously been
Chief Military Observer (CMO) of the United
Nations Angola Verification Mission, and was

very experienced in missions with mandates
similar to that of the ONUCA operation. Following
the completion of this reconnaissance and
Gomes’ report to the UN secretary-general, the
deployment of ONUCA came to the UN Security
Council.35 On 7 November 1989, the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 644 (1989), approving
the deployment of military peacekeepers to the
region. Canada agreed in principle to contribute
about 40 military observers as well as up to
100 helicopter aircrew and eight CH-139 Jet
Ranger helicopters. Three weeks later in Ottawa,
Brigadier-General Ian C. Douglas was notified
that OPERATION SULTAN (Canada’s designation
for the ONUCA deployment) had begun, and that
he was to become ONUCA’s chief of staff (COS) as
well as commander of the Canadian contingent.
Major Claude Guerin was to be Douglas’ deputy
commanding officer (DCO). Another senior
Canadian officer, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Morris,
was appointed senior staff officer air operations
at ONUCA HQ.36 In total nine CF members were
tasked to deploy with the advance party on
3 December, with an additional 12 members
augmenting the advance party on 4 January
1990.37 The total lead contingent numbered
approximately 30 military officers, 13 medical
staff, and three pilots. This group established the
ONUCA HQ in the offices of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) in Tegucigalpa,
the Honduran capital.
13
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Major Claude Guerin, DCO of the Canadian ONUCA contingent, and Major Peter Abbott, maintenance
ofﬁcer, discuss local security with a Honduran policeman near the Danli Veriﬁcation Centre.

Brigadier-General Douglas had a wide range
of command responsibilities, including ensuring
that liaison offices were established in the capitals
of all five countries and that the necessary
arrangements were made for the establishment
of the first group of verification centres. As well,
accommodations at the Tegucigalpa Airport had
to be prepared for the arrival of Canada’s 89
Rotary Air Wing Unit [89 (Cdn) RWAU] as well
as a Dornier 228-200 light aircraft arriving from
Germany. All of this was accomplished without
incident.38

Mission Evolution

T

he ONUCA advance party was immediately
faced with unexpected challenges. Setting up
in Guatemala and Costa Rica was sluggish for
many reasons, and ONUCA was unable to establish
any liaison or verification centres in El Salvador
until mid January 1990. Much more troubling,
just as the UN Security Council was about to
approve Resolution 644 creating ONUCA, failed
negotiations between the Salvadoran government

and the left-wing Frente Farabundo Martí para
la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) led to open
violence. On 31 October 1989, the FMLN bombed
a Salvadoran Trade Union building killing ten
people and wounding 20 others. The FMLN
then announced its cessation of negotiations
with the government and launched a major
offensive two weeks later. Salvadoran President
Alfredo Cristiani declared a state of emergency,
and within days both sides had suffered
over two thousand casualties in continuous
fighting around the capital city.39 The crash of
a Nicaraguan aircraft laden with missiles and
other arms in El Salvador on 25 November 1989
did little to ease political and military tensions.
The Cristiani government accused Nicaragua of
supplying the FMLN with arms and immediately
suspended diplomatic and economic ties with the
country. This in turn led to an announcement by
the UN and OAS on 5 December, two days after
the ONUCA advance team had arrived, that plans
for the demobilisation of the Contras by the end
of 1989 were no longer possible. The situation
remained fluid as more UN peacekeepers and
their equipment arrived.

14
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The FMLN offensive brought immediate
political reaction from Ottawa. On 22 November,
Michael Jay, the Central American programme
officer for the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), announced that the Canadian
government’s bilateral aid programme for El
Salvador had been temporarily halted. The
programme consisted of over a hundred separate
projects, many of which were perceived as only
assisting the El Salvadoran government in freeing
its own funds for military purposes.40 Canadian
immigration officers in El Salvador issued 100
emergency minister’s permits to Salvadorans for
reunification with their families in Canada, and
ran an emergency airlift that rescued about three
hundred Salvadoran refugees from the raging
civil war.41 These were effective measures and
served as a tangible demonstration of the two-tier
political/military approach Ottawa had taken to
encourage peace in the region.
To help reduce sporadic violence in the
region, ONUCA’s mandate was expanded on 12
December to include the verification and cessation
of hostilities as well as the demobilisation of
irregular forces that might be agreed upon in
the region. 42 For the UN military observers
(UNMO) on the ground this meant more work,
but also the opportunity to achieve a lasting
effect. It was hoped that ONUCA could disband
Contra bases along the Honduran-Nicaraguan
border, and assist with the demobilisation of the
FMLN in El Salvador. During the next two weeks
ONUCA established 13 verification centres, each
garrisoned with up to ten UNMOs. Canadian
soldiers and aircrew were issued with jungle

survival kits and other necessary gear, while the
Jet Ranger helicopters were repainted, given
UN aircraft markings, and fitted with special
communications equipment, distance measuring
equipment, and infrared suppression kits. The
last item was a wise precaution because even with
UN markings the ONUCA helicopters might be
perceived as a threat, accidentally or otherwise.
The suppression kits provided some protection
against the heat-seeking surface-to-air (SAM)
missiles that the FMLN guerrillas and Contras
were believed to still have in their arsenals.43
Once in place, Canadian and other ONUCA
UNMOs immediately made their presence
and mission known to the local organizations
and populations. This was no small task, as
a single operational post could be responsible
for patrolling over a hundred kilometres of
complex terrain. UNMOs conducted daily patrols
of their areas of responsibility by land, air, and
even occasionally by river. Remote posts were
often inaccessible by road, which in turn made
the Canadian helicopters indispensable.44 UN
observers at Las Trojes, Honduras, for example,
were responsible for a 110 kilometre section of
the Honduran-Nicaraguan border that included
the major Contra bases as well as three refugee
camps.45 The post also required all of its supplies
to be airlifted in, as there was neither food nor
accommodations in situ to support the observer
teams.
Throughout January 1990 the conditions
around El Salvador improved only slightly.
The FMLN had been encouraged to return to

CFJIC IXC90-78

An ONUCA helicopter detachment including Canadian Jet Rangers sets off on a border patrol.

15
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2008

Godefroy - ONUCA.indd 15

11

27/05/2008 3:11:12 PM

Canadian Military History, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 2

negotiations with the Cristiani government,
allowing the ONUCA liaison office to finally
be established in San Salvador. However, the
prevailing security conditions greatly restricted
what observers could do and where they could
go, which made demobilisation of the FMLN
extremely difficult. As the year dragged on
negotiation crumbled once more, and eventually
the El Salvador situation merited its own separate
UN mission the following year.46
The challenges facing ONUCA continually
increased as the mission went on. With the
exception of El Salvador, phase two of ONUCA
began on schedule with the establishment of
Verification Centres (VCs), and was completed by
18 January 1990. Additional Canadian material
and personnel arrived in theatre that same week,
augmenting the Canadian contingent’s strength
to 122 personnel and four helicopters.47 The
third phase of ONUCA (19 January to 4 March
1990) proved more difficult to complete. Some
of the countries that initially committed to deploy
troops found themselves unable or unwilling to
provide all of the military observers required.
This in turn affected ONUCA’s ability to effectively
patrol trouble spots making an arduous task even
more difficult. Colonel John D. Joly, a senior
Canadian officer who commanded Observer
Group El Salvador (OGELS), noted in 1991
that ONUCA, “has neither the authority nor the
capacity to prevent, by physical means, either
the movement of armed persons or war-like
material across borders or other violations.”48
He added, “in practice it quickly became clear
that ONUCA’s capacity was very limited…an
international peace-keeping operation simply
cannot undertake the detection of clandestine
activities without assuming functions that
properly belong to the security forces of the
country or countries concerned.”49
It proved difficult to find the four fast patrol
boats needed to monitor the Gulf of Fonseca.
Eventually, Argentina supplied the vessels and
some crew with the remainder being made up
once more by Canada.50 Based at San Lorenzo,
Honduras, the naval verification centre carried
out daily patrols in the gulf and its approaches
to the Pacific Ocean. Naval personnel observed
and recorded patterns of maritime traffic so
they could identify anything out of character.
Additionally, Canadian naval observers made

regular visits to naval bases maintained in or
near the Gulf of Fonseca.51

Demobilization and Transition

D

espite the slow and at times painful steps
taken towards peace, Canada believed
that progress could be made with ONUCA.
Fortunately, ONUCA’s mandate was assisted
by the rapid transition in East-West relations
in 1990 that signalled the end of the Cold War.
The drastic reduction in military and financial
assistance from both Moscow and Washington to
Central America weakened all factions and also
encouraged the transition towards a peaceful
settlement. On 9 February 1990, Minister of
National Defence Bill McKnight announced in
the House of Commons that, “in the case of
Central America the level of risk is manageable,
and is justified by the importance we attach to
the process of advancing peace in the region.”52
Ottawa clearly sensed there was an opportunity
to complete the mission successfully, and in turn
augmented its troop commitment to ONUCA
the following month. All five Central American
governments perceived the additional Canadian
support as a sign of good faith that demobilization
and democratisation was possible.53
On 25 February the National Opposition
Union (UNO) coalition headed by Mrs. Violeta
Chamorro defeated President Daniel Ortega of the
incumbent Sandinista government in a surprising
upset. The Contras were jubilant over the results,
and indicated their desire to disband as the
conflict was now over. While some Contra leaders
were hesitant to give up their arms, the end of
American financial aid to their cause soon left the
Contras with few resources to continue. As well, a
large portion of Sandinista support had dissolved
in the wake of the election, leaving Chamorro’s
UNO party the opportunity to demilitarise a large
portion of Central America and establish a zone
of peace.54
The demobilization of Contras required
considerably more manpower than ONUCA could
bring to bear and the unarmed UNMOs could not
forcibly disarm anyone. Throughout this period
General Douglas worked closely with all elements,
achieving considerable success in implementing
confidence-building measures. However, he was
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frustrated by the lack of resources available to
complete the task at hand. On 15 March the
UN Security Council decided that additional air
and land power would be required to effect the
demobilisation and repatriation of the Contras
and Sandinistas. UN Security Resolution 650
(1990) was passed the following week, enlarging
the ONUCA mandate to include demobilisation
operations and authorising the increase of
the mission strength with armed personnel.
Venezuela, who already had UNMOs with ONUCA,
provided a paratrooper battalion to supervise

contingent had played a major role in providing
the conditions to make peace possible. Scheduled
to return to Canada soon after the demobilisation
of Nicaragua had been completed, General
Douglas had considered Canada’s contribution
to ONUCA thus far most influential and satisfying
towards achieving peace.56
The process of seeking Douglas’ successor
began in April 1990. An offer by BrigadierGeneral Lewis W. Mackenzie to succeed him
was originally denied by NDHQ, who then later

The Canadian ONUCA Contingent.

ground operations while Canada lent additional
air support. On 22 March Ottawa announced
that it was dispatching further pilots and support
personnel, and augmenting the Canadian air
element with an additional four Twin Huey
helicopters.55 The additional commitment raised
the strength of the Canadian contingent to 169
all ranks.

reversed its decision and assigned him to take
over the Canadian contingent. General Mackenzie
reported to Ottawa in late April and received a
two-week crash course in Spanish before heading
to UN headquarters in June 1990 for further
briefings. On 7 August 1990, General Mackenzie
arrived in Tegucigalpa to complete his hand over
from General Douglas.57

The demobilization of all groups began in
April 1990 and was largely completed by the end
of July. On the night of 18-19 April, all Nicaraguan
parties agreed to a series of arrangements that
included an immediate cease-fire and separation
of forces. Canadian soldiers were involved at
all levels and in every area. General Douglas,
who had been with ONUCA since the beginning,
oversaw many of the weapon turn-ins and
arranged for their proper disposal by the UN.
What at first seemed unlikely in Central America
had quickly turned into reality and the Canadian

General Mackenzie was immediately faced
with the challenge of determining the necessity of
ONUCA’s continued presence. General Douglas’
success with the demobilization of the Contras
had been so effective many were wondering if
there was any further need for ONUCA now that
the largest force that had destabilized the region
had been subdued. As well, just days before his
arrival Iraq invaded its smaller neighbour Kuwait,
and Ottawa’s attention immediately refocused
towards this latest international crisis. General
Mackenzie, on Ottawa’s orders, substantially
17
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reduced Canada’s ONUCA contingent (with
General Gomez’ approval) to reflect both the
decreased activity of the mission as well as a
potential new demand for forces in the Persian
Gulf.58
With little need to continue patrolling of
remote border areas, most of Canada’s air
contingent returned home at the end of August
1990. Captain William Callaghan, the Adjutant of
89 (Cdn) RWAU, noted that his unit had, “played
a major role in bringing the demobilisation of the
Nicaraguan resistance movement to a successful
conclusion.”59
The reduction of the overall ONUCA
deployment strength and the return of General
Gomez to Spain left General Mackenzie as acting
commander of the mission in December 1990.
Canada’s contingent had been reduced to about
only 30 personnel, most having returned to their
units in Canada or to fill positions vacated by
Canadian Forces officers who deployed to the
Persian Gulf. In March 1991, Canada dispatched
eight observers to assist in the monitoring of
municipal and legislative elections in El Salvador,
but made no increases to its ONUCA contingent.
General Mackenzie commanded ONUCA until 17
May 1991, when he handed the mission over to
Brigadier-General Victor Suanez Pardo of Spain.
General Pardo commanded ONUCA until its
conclusion the following year.

Conclusion

T

he Central American peace process took
more than a decade to become effective.
Canada was involved in the process nearly from
the outset, contributing political and then military
assistance. At both levels Canada acted as a force
of reason. Ottawa’s involvement at the political
level was invaluable. Canadian presence and
assistance in negotiations offset the traditional
hemispheric hegemony of the United States,
adding legitimacy because of the country’s
dispassionate credibility to Central American
initiatives for peace. Canada’s involvement at
the military level ensured that experience and
professionalism would characterise the ONUCA
mission that was expected to carry out the
complex mandate stipulated in the Esquipulas
II Agreement. However, the willingness of the

five Central American governments and their
non-state actors to participate in the process
ultimately ensured its success.
For the Canadian military many valuable
lessons were learned from ONUCA. First and
perhaps most important, ONUCA foreshadowed
the ‘new’ peacekeeping of the 1990s where
mandates became increasingly complex and
peacekeeping itself became more dangerous.
Robust leadership, command, and control
was needed for success but at times military
personnel on the ground found such support
wanting. For example, while satisfied with the
continuous political support from Ottawa and
generally clear lines of communications with
NDHQ, General Mackenzie later complained
that his greatest frustrations instead were with
the slow and complex decision-making system
at UN headquarters in New York.60 It was a
nightmare that would that would be repeated in
the Balkans.
The mission also revealed the capability
gaps that existed within a Canadian military still
oriented towards fighting a Euro-centric Third
World War. Strategic command and control at
NDHQ was improving, but missions such as
ONUCA, the UN Transition Assistance Group
to Namibia (UNTAG), and the United Nations
Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL),
as well as missions such as Operation BANDIT
(Haiti) during 1987-88, the Oka Crisis in 1990,
and the Gulf War in 1990-91, all stressed the need
for the creation of a strategic level joint operational
staff as soon as possible. Operationally, force
generation and force employment were showing
stress, especially with the requirement to sustain
a number of missions simultaneously across the
globe. In 1990-91 CF elements were deployed in
Central America, but they were also in Germany,
the Gulf, the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle
East. These deployments had a tremendous effect
on both personnel and force structures, both of
which were already stressed as a result of the
government’s military reductions in its search
for a Cold War peace dividend.
Despite these deficiencies there was little that
could be done at the time. In February 1992, just
as the Canadian ONUCA mission was concluding,
the Federal government tabled a new budget that
included significant cuts to the military. The
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commitment to leave the Standing Task Force in
Europe was cancelled, and the 1,100 positions
planned for that force were simply eliminated.
The regular force component was further
reduced, and the intended growth of the Army
Reserve delayed.61 Lieutenant-General Gervais,
the Commander of the Army at the time, stated
bluntly that the “demands for a peace dividend
have created new realities in defence funding.
They are reflected in restricted Regular Force
manning levels, infrastructure rationalization,
and tighter budgets for all resource managers.
These factors are necessitating changes in the
Army structure.”62
Operations in complex terrain against
elusive adversaries and targets demanded state
of the art resources, tactics, techniques, and
procedures. The CF had neither the mandate
nor the resources adequately to focus on such
requirements even though it was being committed
to increasingly complex UN missions that
required such capabilities. As well, the military
was stretched thin by ongoing deployments
and had no spares or reinforcements readily
at hand; had something gone seriously wrong
in Central America the Canadians may have
had to withdraw from the mission. This would
have had serious consequences for the CF, but
also for Canadian foreign policy as a whole. It is
therefore a testament to the quality of the men
and women of the Canadian Forces who served
with ONUCA that the mission was a success.
That success gave a boost to the credibility of
Canadian foreign policy because the country was
able to play a positive role in the peace process
in Central America at the end of the Cold War.
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